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I. Introduction
Since the beginning of their tenure, the Obama administration and Secretary of
the Interior Ken Salazar have made renewable energy, particularly offshore, a top
priority.1 Even though former President Bush issued an Executive Order to assist in the
development of energy-related projects back in 2001, little focus and almost no progress
have been made in the field of offshore renewable energy.2 This lack of progress was
due primarily to a jurisdictional dispute between the Department of Interior’s Minerals
Management Service (MMS) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
The dispute held up the publication of the final rule for siting renewable energy facilities
on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which was only recently decided.3 To date, the
utility of these projects has been recognized, noting the benefit to the environment by
providing clean production, increased national security by reducing the need for foreign
oil, economy revenue by providing more jobs, and providing the foundation for a future
of sustainable energy production.4 The goal has shifted from a developing interest to
actually developing the projects.
Therein lays the problem. Development of new industries requires enormous
financial backing, and investors do not favor uncertainty or inefficiency. Before
construction can begin, projects must obtain the necessary permits, leases, licenses, and
rights-of-way. In this current climate, the regulatory process is uncertain and delayed.
The proponents of the Cape Wind Energy Project began the application process in 2001
for a lease off of Cape Cod, Massachusetts to build a wind farm; the permitting process is
close to completion but is still not finalized.5 In stark contrast, a license to build a
deepwater port for crude oil or liquid natural gas (LNG) can be obtained within two years
of the notice of application.6
The contrast in application timetables for the respective offshore projects is the
result of many factors; but, the factor that this paper will primarily address is the
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction exercised by different competing governmental
agencies for the development of energy projects. While agencies overseeing established
industries, such as LNG and crude oil, have long since realized the necessity to cooperate
by signing Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), the nascent renewable energy
industry, has resulted in redundant reviews and processes that greatly increase application
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Secretary of the Interior Salazar Order no 3285 Sec. 2. March 11, 2009.
Executive Order 13212 May 18, 2001.
3
See 74 FR 19638 (April 29, 2009) for Notice of Availability of the MMS Final Rule.
4
Secretary of the Interior Salazar Order no 3285 Sec. 2. In this order Secretary Salazar addresses the
omissions/ambiguities of EO 13212 by gearing this order to renewable energy, creating a task force that is
not overly large and with clearly identified tasks, and by specifically identifying duties under the order for
certain Department of the Interior employees.
5
74 FR 3635-3636 (Jan. 21, 2009). Notice of Availability of the Final EIS for the Cape Wind Energy
Project.
6
74 FR 984-985 (Jan. 9, 2009). Notice of application for an offshore port system crude oil deepwater port
license application. This particular application was approved and the license was issued on April 29, 2005,
a mere fifteen months later. See 74 FR 31479.
2
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time. This unnecessary increase in application time is a hindrance for both investors and
developers looking to build an offshore renewable project.7
Offshore projects are regulated by a combination of governmental agencies. An
applicant wanting to build a wind farm beyond the state’s 3-nm limit must obtain a lease
from MMS, and meet all the pertinent environmental requirements. The applicant must
also gain a right-of-way for transmission lines from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and from the governing state agencies that hold jurisdiction from
the 3-nm to the shoreline. Other interested agencies ranges from the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to the United States Coast Guard (USCG). In short, there
is ample opportunity for an agency to deny or severely delay a project application (which
is the fiscal equivalent of killing it) particularly in the absence of well-established data
that would allow these projects to satisfy the environmental regulations. By comparison,
an offshore oilrig may satisfy the environmental regulatory process faster than a project
like a wind farm. As California Governor Schwarzenneger states, “…environmental
regulations are holding up environmental progress in some cases.”8
This paper will examine existing MOUs used to streamline the regulatory
processes for energy facilities. Research conducted on numerous MOUs provide
examples of the more pertinent agreements which could be utilized for the purposes of
drafting MOUs to streamline the regulatory procedures for offshore renewable energy
projects. The MOU between FERC and MMS for hydrokinetic facilities on the OCS is a
prime example of a successful joint process. This paper will not include the specifics of
the regulatory process, but will instead focus on the use of the MOU for coordination and
cooperation. Whether an MOU may create a joint application process; whether an MOU
may establish a schedule and bind parties to it; and finally, whether there are any legal
cases regarding enforcement of MOUs will be addressed.
II. Terms of a Memorandum of Understanding
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is an agreement between parties to
satisfy certain requirements to the best of each party’s ability for mutual benefit. While a
contract presents legal remedies should a party fail to perform, an MOU does not. MOUs
are not as binding as contracts, a characteristic likely to be of concern to lawyers and
investors, both of whom crave certainty. However, this arguable weakness in binding
power may be considered the strength of the MOU. All parties want to retain their own
authority and freedom of movement, and governmental agencies are often statutorily
bound to retain their authority and freedom of movement.9
There are times when certainty of action, while desirable, comes second to other
obligations. For this reason, a non-legally binding MOU may be preferable to
7

MMS final Rule Page 19. The MMS Final Rule acknowledges that the uncertainty involved in ROW and
RUE granting and overseeing requirements is a hindrance to an applicant’s attainment of financial backing.
8
“Governor Schwarzenegger Advances State’s Renewable Energy Development” online press release
available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/11073/ accessed 6/16/2009 at 10:37 am.
9
Phone Interview with Adam Bless of the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council on Aug. 3 2009.
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individuals, parties, companies, and governmental agencies over a legally binding
contract, which may be preferable to investors and lawyers. MOUs present an alternative
to contracts that may be more attractive in certain situations.
MOUs have the potential to help streamline the regulatory process for offshore
renewable energy projects. For example MOUs are often used to establish multi-party
cooperation without resorting to legal force, and this cooperation would likely result in a
streamlined regulatory process. A well-written MOU may provide an unrestrained
system with terms that will likely result in repetitive cooperative acts, thus putting the
parties in a good position to overcome competitive tendencies and establish instead a
cooperative relationship. MOUs may therefore serve as the foundation for an ongoing
cooperative relationship between parties that provides the mutual benefits the parties
seek.
The format and wording of a MOU are flexible, but there are standard sections to
be included. A typical MOU usually includes, the title, Preamble, Agreement,
Boilerplate, and signatures, followed by any Attachments.10 Excluding the title and
signatures, these sections are usually divided into subsections. For example, the
Preamble typically includes an introduction or Background; a Purpose that outlines the
general or specific goal of the MOU; and the Acknowledgments, where the parties make
preliminary declarations of understanding or concession. For MOUs between
governmental agencies, the Acknowledgments section usually has paragraphs or
subsections that identify exactly what duties each agency is statutorily obligated to fulfill.
The Agreements section follows and is often divided into numbered, lettered, titled, or
undesignated paragraphs or terms, addressing specific points of the agreement for each
party. These terms can be as short as a sentence or two or can be a lengthy paragraph.
They may be organized into clusters of terms specific to each party, or between parties.
The Boilerplate, or miscellaneous terms, is a section of general terms regarding the
implementation and limits of the MOU. While MOUs often follow this pattern of
Preamble, Agreements, and boilerplate followed by the signatures and any attachments
the format is flexible. The parties may construct a format and structure preferable to
specific needs while tailoring the terms, Acknowledgments, and Boilerplate to best
satisfy the Purpose of the MOU.
III. The Use of MOUs in Court
Within the Boilerplate section of an MOU, it is noted that the terms present no
legal cause of action, and research suggests that MOUs are not legally enforced. Yet,
American jurisprudence does not completely ignore MOUs. A number of cases exists
involving disputes in which a MOU was presented as evidence.11 Chao v. Mallard Bay
Drilling, Inc. is a typical case illustrating a court’s use of an MOU.12 In that case the
10

See Appendix A.
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council. 129 S.Ct. 2458, 2475 (2009); National
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defender of Wildlife. 551 US 644 (2007); Dept. of the Interior and Bureau of
Indian Affairs v. Klamth Water Users Protective Associtation. 532 U.S. 1, 5 (2001).
12
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. 534 U.S. 235 (2001).
11
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United States Supreme Court cited the terms of agreement in a MOU between the USCG
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to define the
jurisdictional division between them regarding worker safety on inspected and
uninspected vessels.13 While MOUs do not appear to be legally enforceable, often times
the terms themselves provide evidentiary support.
If a party to an MOU were to ignore the terms, the court would most likely not
grant specific performance. For example, if FERC failed to include the license
requirement that an applicant must comply with all terms and conditions of an MMS
issued lease, it would be in violation of Term F within the April 9, 2009 MOU between
FERC and MMS which requires FERC to include this requirement in its licenses;
furthermore, a court would not be able to order FERC to do so due to Section IV which
states that the MOU does not create “any private right or cause of action for or by any
person or entity”.14 Resolution of such a dilemma would result from the respective
parties discussion of the omission, but if an agreement to either comply or amend the
MOU proved impossible between them, the dispute would lead to further discussion
between the Secretary of the Interior and Chairman of FERC. If there was still no
consensus, higher authorities might intervene or the MOU might even be terminated.
While the court system does not appear to enforce MOUs, there are typically terms
within a MOU to resolve disputes and keep the parties focused on their mutual goal
rather than becoming embroiled in litigations.
IV. MOUs Clarifying Jurisdiction for Renewable Energy Projects
A. FERC and MMS
As stated earlier, the parties to a MOU often acknowledge their respective
responsibilities in the Preamble, particularly if the purpose of the MOU is to settle
disputes over responsibilities and jurisdiction. A clarifying statement where the parties
agree to the acknowledgment of respective responsibilities between the two agencies with
overlapping jurisdiction can be the first cooperative act in a history of cooperation that
establishes a strong relationship between them.
For example, the new administration called for the MOU of April 2009 between
MMS and FERC due to the jurisdictional conflict created by the Energy Policy Act of
2005, particularly for offshore renewable licensing.15 While ambiguously worded and
general in scope, the April 2009 MOU takes the first big step towards interagency
cooperation between MMS and FERC.16 By acknowledging that both MMS and FERC
have licensing responsibilities on the Outer Continental Shelf and by clarifying the
difference between their roles, each agency agreed to a defined partition of jurisdiction.
13

Id. at 243.
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of the Interior and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission at 2-3. (April 9, 2009).
15
Secretary of the Interior Salazar Order no 3285 Sec. 2. March 11, 2009. By putting a high priority level
on renewable energy this order was among other things a call for MMS to cease its feud with FERC.
16
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dept. of Interior and Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n.
April 9, 2009.
14
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Thus the main problem of, “Who does what?” was solved. The MOU even went even
further by adding terms calling for communication and cooperation.17 Because the MOU
essentially came at the bequest of higher authorities, there is even more likelihood of
compliance with this MOU. Eventually, as the parties have time to further sort out their
differences following this initial understanding, a relationship will develop and their
initial agreement can be refined.18
Despite MMS’ new authority for offshore projects, FERC continues to be
involved in hydrokinetic offshore renewable energy projects. Luckily, FERC has many
MOUs regarding various types of overlapping authority with regard to energy project
regulation.19 This history is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate to the mutual
benefit of involved agencies that will probably surface once tensions have had a chance
to subside. FERC’s MOU history also provides some good examples of how MOUs can
shape cooperative policies without legal force.
B. FERC and the state of Oregon
In March of 2008, FERC signed an MOU with several agencies of the State of
Oregon to coordinate review procedures and schedules for proposed wave energy
projects in the adjacent territorial waters.20 Pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA),
FERC has authority to grant licenses for hydrokinetic projects, whether in the territorial
sea or on the OCS.21 Likewise, Oregon has authority to regulate projects within its state
waters pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Clean Water Act,
National Historic Preservation Act, and the FPA.22
Both Oregon and FERC had a mutual interest in promoting renewable energy
projects; an MOU was signed in order to coordinate their respective reviews. The MOU
asserts Oregon’s recognition of FERC’s authority and its pilot-licensing program; it then
specifies procedures for notification of the other party regarding potential applicants, in
order to commence a coordinated review process.23 The MOU incorporates agreed upon
milestones into the review process of each applicant, to which both shall strive to
adhere.24 The MOU requires Oregon to “complete any actions required of it within the
timeframes established in the schedule” except when doing so proves impossible, as well
17

Id.
An in person interview with Mr. Timothy Redding of the MMS revealed that FERC and MMS view this
initial MOU almost like the breaking of the ice between them, and do intend to eventually enter a much
more specific MOU to properly streamline their joint regulatory authority.
19
Links to these MOUs in pdf format may be found on FERC’s website at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/majord-reg/mou.asp.
20
“Memorandum of Understanding Between The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the State of
Oregon By and Through Its Departments of Fish & Wildlife, Land Conservation & Development,
Environmental Quality, State Lands, Water Resources, Parks & Recreation, and Energy” March 26, 2008.
21
16 U.S.C. §§791(a) et. seq. (read this)
22
16 U.S.C. §§1451 et. Seq. (CZMA); 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (CWA); 16 U.S.C. §§470 et. Seq. (NHPA);
16 U.S.C. §§791a et. Seq. (FPA) (read these). The states also have authority to regulate what goes into
their respective territorial seas following the …
23
MOU between FERC and Oregon page 2.
24
Id.
18
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as requiring Oregon to comply with legally established deadlines.25 This language is
stricter than that what is contained in other MOUs, which typically only require a good
faith effort by the parties. It does require a best effort at getting other agencies to comply
with the agreed upon timeframe.26
Coordination between the two parties is evident in Paragraph four of the MOU
where the state’s environmental reviews will be conducted in conjunction with FERC’s
standards satisfying the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements
by FERC and the CZMA requirements undertaken by the state.27 The terms are not
specific; neither stipulates a deadline for completion, nor methods for this coordination.
FERC recognizes that Oregon is drafting a comprehensive plan, while gathering
sufficient data, that will identify certain areas appropriate for wave projects; FERC has
agreed to consider the plan pursuant to the FPA.28 Both parties acknowledge that any
pilot projects must include terms and conditions appropriate to protect natural
resources.29 The MOU concludes with four paragraphs of “boilerplate”, where the parties
agree to the following: nothing in it prevents them from seeking redress at law; nothing
requires either party to do anything contrary to applicable law; the MOU does not deal
with fund transfers; the MOU takes affect when all parties have signed; it may be
modified anytime by mutual written agreement; and any party may terminate it upon
thirty days written notice during which time the parties will make a good faith effort to
resolve any disagreements.30 Overall, this MOU appears to be primarily an official
decree that the parties wish to coordinate.
How the terms will be carried out under this MOU remain to be seen, for it is still
relatively new. However, there has been a development that bares some comment. From
FERC’s reports on hydrokinetic power, it would appear that four preliminary permits
have been issued for projects in Oregon and none are pending as of August 6, 2009.31
Oregon has taken a research-oriented approach to wave energy at the time the MOU was
written and FERC was aware of this intent.32 Letters from the governor prior to the
25

Id.
Id.
27
Id. at page 3.
28
Id. See also 10(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the FPA and 18 CFR 2.19. In addition to agreeing to consider a projects
compliance with Oregon’s Comprehensive Plan, FERC acknowledges that Oregon may submit it to NOAA
as an amendment to Oregon’s Coastal Management Plan. As the number of suitable locations in a
comprehensive plan must be limited, the MOU allows Oregon to identify more locations in subsequent
phases of its comprehensive plan.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 4-5.
31
Issued Hydrokinetic Permits (Excel Spreadsheet); Pending Hydrokinetic Permits (Excel Spreadsheet).
Spreadsheet updated as of 8/06/2009, available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indusact/hydrokinetics.asp.
32
See Letter From Oregon Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski To The Ocean Policy Advisory Council on
March 26, 2008. See Also Letter From Oregon Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski To Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. on March 26, 2008. These two letters make
reference to the MOU between Oregon and FERC as if the MOU is now the policy, however the letter
emphasize that Oregon’s interest is to develop the industry by researching impacts first, and only then
building large scale facilities.
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issuance of the most recent preliminary permit signify Oregon’s intent to focus on
research until completion and implementation of a comprehensive plan as mentioned in
the MOU.33 In February of 2009, FERC issued a preliminary permit to a wave energy
developer to the chagrin of much of the public who considered this action a violation of
the terms of the MOU.34 The impression of Oregon is that the MOU forbids FERC to
issue anything other than pilot project licenses until their comprehensive plan was
complete and FERC seems to have thought that they were free to do as they wish with
applications pending at the time of the MOU. A strict reading of the MOU reveals
nothing to clarify this dispute, leading to the conclusion that a term clearly identifying
that this MOU applied only to future filings or clearly specifying Oregon’s desire that no
preliminary permits or licenses would be issued until their comprehensive plan was
complete might have prevented this problem. When drafting MOUs, it is important to
include an amendment, dispute resolution procedure to prevent any unforeseen
circumstances, and a clarifying scope.
C. FERC and the State of Maine
FERC and Maine signed a MOU on August 18, 2009.35 This agreement includes
deadlines for, “…action on an application for a state permit and a request for water
quality certification.”36 Maine also agreed to a deadline for issuing a state submerged
lands lease and schedules set by FERC for pilot project licenses “to the extent feasible.”37
The FERC/Maine MOU does not specify the effect of the MOU on any pending
applications, nor does it seem to apply to anything but tidal energy. It extends its
application to state lands and any federal lands that will have an impact on Maine’s
coastal areas, and it also addresses the problem with site banking by having FERC
acknowledge the importance of considering potential for wind energy in any areas under
review for a tidal project application. This is in contrast to the somewhat unspecific
language of the MOU between FERC and Oregon, this inclusion of timetables and efforts
to abide by them appears promising.

33

See Letter From Oregon Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski To The Ocean Policy Advisory Council on
March 26, 2008. See Also Letter From Oregon Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski To Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. on March 26, 2008.
34
Susan Chambers, “Surprising Oregon Wave Energy FERC Permit Issued” The World, Feb. 3, 2009.
Available at http://mendocoastcurrent.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/surprising-oregon-wave-energy-fercpermit-issued/. The source is disputable because FERC’s spreadsheets list the permit in question as issued
on March 9, 2007, before the MOU was written. This paper briefly treats it as correct to flush out a flaw in
the MOU drafting. On a positive note, the article seems to place a sacrosanct status on the MOU detectable
through the outrage that FERC may have ignored one of its provisions, which evidences a public and
stakeholder reliance on the wording of MOUs making them a powerful tool in non-binding agreements.
35
Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the State of
Maine by and through its Governor and Departments of Conservation, Environmental Protection, Inland
Fisheries and Wildlife, and Marine Resources, State Planning Office, and Governor’s Office of Energy
Independence and Security. (Aug. 18, 2009).
36
Id. at 4.
37
Id. at 3-4.
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V. FERC and Liquid Natural Gas
FERC has MOUs relating to its “exclusive authority to approve or deny an
application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an [Liquid Natural
Gas] terminal.”38 The following section will focus on a few to illustrate cooperative
relationships between FERC and other agencies. The first MOU was signed with The
Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1985.39
A. 1985 MOU between FERC and DOT
The DOT has authority pursuant to the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968
and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for its Research and Special Programs
Administration. It exercises this authority to set and enforce safety regulations and
standards for Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) transportation in or affecting interstate
commerce. The United States Coast Guard also exercises authority over LNG facilities
that affect port safety and navigable waterways pursuant to EO 10173, the Magnuson
Act, and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. The aforementioned agencies
signed an MOU specifying their particular authority relating to LNG.40
FERC has authority, with respect to interstate LNG transportation, to accept or
deny applications, or to accept with terms and conditions, and to conduct reviews of the
cryogenics during the siting process and biennially after certification. DOT has authority
to set and enforce regulations extending “to the design, installation,
construction…operation, and maintenance of facilities…”41 There is noticeably some
similarity and overlap in what both parties are required to do, the elimination of which
would probably save time and resources to both parties and the industry. This MOU
states that its purpose is to provide guidance and policy regarding “the fixed siting,
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of fixed LNG facilities” to the agencies
respective staffs and to the industry.42
The agreements section is divided into subsections, the first two specify the
actions to be taken by FERC and DOT respectively.43 The drafters of the MOU inserted
language allowing a party to avoid compliance if necessary. Rather than stating, “The
[FERC/DOT] shall to the extent possible:” or “The [FERC/DOT] should when
practicable:” where the terms of agreement would appear far less forceful and certain
than they do when the italicized words are omitted. This MOU is a good example of
strong term writing, which almost appears to be binding, and which enumerates the few

38

15 U.S.C. §717(b)(e)(1). This authority was originally granted via the Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep’t of Transp. and the Fed.Energy Regulatory Comm’n
Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas Transportation Facilities. (Apr. 16, 1985).
40
Id. at 1.
41
Id. at 1-2. DOT exercises authority over both interstate, intrastate, and foreign commerce, even though it
leaves enforcement to the states for intrastate commerce; FERC exercises authority over interstate and
foreign commerce. This MOU limits the agreement to interstate and foreign LNG transportation.
42
Id. at 2.
43
Id. at 2-3.

39
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exceptions to action, leaving the parties with a clear understanding of what each will do
and when.
An example of a broad term contained in this agreement appears in section 1(e):
“When such voluntary agreements are reached, the FERC staff will promptly notify DOT
of the agreements and provide appropriate background material.”44 While the word
“promptly” is not specifically defined by a term of days or hours, it is still a somewhat
strict qualifier, and taken in light of the exception’s purpose, a stricter time limit for
notification is probably unnecessary.45 The word “appropriate” would be quite vague
were it not for the section 1(d) in which the background material that the FERC is
normally required to provide the DOT is defined; giving the parties a proper standard of
appropriateness before using it as a qualifier.46
Other examples of broad language found in DOT’s section include Section 2(b),
which states, “[The DOT shall:] Take whatever action [it] considers appropriate in the
discharge of its responsibilities in the matter referred by FERC.”47 The term then goes on
to enumerate some of the most likely actions the DOT will take.48 Even though this term
seems to leave a wide array of possible actions open, thus creating uncertainty, the listing
of possible actions as well as the specification that the action is taken in the discharge of
[DOT’s] responsibilities provides some expectation that whatever DOT chooses to do
will be a direct result of its own regulations and standards.49 In the Purpose section of the
MOU, the parties acknowledge that DOT has “exclusive authority to promulgate Federal
safety standards” and that FERC has authority to impose stricter requirements in “special
circumstances.”50 While an applicant or operating facility under FERC’s jurisdiction
must comply with FERC’s requirements, it may already be in compliance with DOT’s
requirements. Hence, when FERC finds a problem it may or may not be a DOT problem;
therefore, FERC puts DOT on notice, as well as the applicant or operator. The applicant
or operator then has thirty days to send comments to DOT, and at the end of sixty days
DOT must have a decision of its own action on notice, as well as a deadline for the
applicant or operator to comply if compliance is necessary.51 Essentially, DOT is the
44

Id. at 3. (emphasis added). Section 1(e) is itself an exception term; it lays out an exception to section
1(b) which requires the FERC to refer to DOT for its review and its comments whenever the FERC
proposes a corrective action for safety reasons, and the FERC’s safety standard differs from the DOT’s.
The exception encapsulated in section 1(e) allows the FERC to omit referring to the DOT’s review and
asking for comment only when the applicant or facility owner voluntarily agrees to take the proposed
actions. This exception has the affect of eliminating redundant oversight, while still informing DOT of the
concern and action, so that if it happens that the DOT has further safety concerns they too may be raised.
45
Id. The term involves an exception to terms 1(b) through 1(d) in which FERC must notify DOT if it has
proposed an action to an applicant or operator that is different than DOT’s procedures. When this happens
FERC notifies DOT and then must wait for DOT’s response. Under the exception in 1(e) the applicant or
operator voluntarily agrees to comply and FERC no longer needs to wait for a DOT response to the
recommendation, instead they simply let DOT know what is happening.
46
Id. at 2-3.
47
Id. at 3. (emphasis added).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 2.
51
Id. at 2-3.
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lead agency, in that an applicant or operator can rest assured that if DOT standards are
not met, than neither are FERC’s.
The MOU sets up a communication system whereby both parties keep each other
and the applicant or operator informed of their actions and requirements. FERC agrees to
invite DOT to its inspections and conferences with operators, and DOT agrees to give
FERC notice of any inspections it plans on conducting on a facility under FERC’s
jurisdiction, and to provide FERC with DOT’s findings.52 DOT also agreed to apply its
enforcement authority to any actions that FERC recommends and to which DOT agrees if
the facility fails to comply with them.53 This is a particularly interesting agreement, as it
adds immediate support to FERC’s demands in one of the special circumstances in which
FERC could impose stricter requirements.54
The Boilerplate section follows the two “agreements” sections. Section 3 of the
Boilerplate specifies that both parties will designate representatives and will arrange to
work jointly to properly execute the MOU. Section 4 specifies that the MOU takes effect
on the date of the last signing and will apply to applications filed and all facilities
operating on and after that date. Section 5 declares that the MOU makes no restrictions
to the agencies’ statutory authorities. Section 6 allows for the modification, suspension,
or termination of the MOU by either party following thirty days of written notice to the
other party.55 The Termination Clause has a qualifier, permitting a party to modify,
suspend, or terminate only if the statutory authority identified in the preamble is altered
or abolished.56
Overall, this MOU seems well written in that it clearly identifies what is to be
done and when; and it avoids ambiguous terms or broad language. When there are
exceptions to action, or broad language, it does not seem to adversely affect the purpose
of the MOU, which is to establish a system whereby FERC and the DOT work together
to accomplish their respective, statutorily mandated tasks. As this paper will explain
below, this MOU resulted in a cooperative relationship between the parties, and it
spawned further MOUs that refined that relationship.
B. 1993 MOU between FERC and DOT
In 1993, FERC and DOT signed a second MOU, the Preamble of which appears
much like that of the 1985 MOU.57 However, the Background information omits the
52

Id. at 2,4.
Id. at 4.
54
This providing of support by one party to another may be another method of building a strong
cooperative relationship through trust, support, and even dependence. MOU terms providing for parties to
support one another’s actions under appropriate conditions may yield stronger relationships between the
parties.
55
Id. at 4.
56
Id. This condition requisite for a termination are modification will probably create more certainty of
action between the parties because parties are not completely free to opt out of the MOU.
57
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep’t of Transp. And the Fed.Energy Regulatory Comm’n
Regarding Natural Gas Transportation Facilities. (Jan. 15, 1993).
53

12

DOT’s use of the USCG. The Acknowledgments section states FERC’s “authority over
the siting of interstate natural gas transmission facilities” and its ability to mitigate
expected environmental damage by imposing conditions prior to construction of a
facility, while again affirming DOT’s “exclusive authority to promulgate Federal safety
standards” for natural gas transportation facilities.58
In reading the Agreements section, it appears that DOT and FERC took a step
back from the rather specific language of the 1985 MOU. For example, Term 1(c)
requiring DOT to “[e]stablish a means to notify the [FERC] of significant enforcement
actions involving pipeline facilities…” fails to set a time by which this must be done.59
With the exception of the qualifying term, “promptly,” there appears to be no deadlines
for compliance with any of the terms in this MOU. However, there is a term that may
help clarify this lack of deadlines. It follows the Agreements section and resembles the
Boilerplate term this paper generally refers to as the Points of Contact Term, only this
term, in addition to requiring both parties to designate staff representatives, also requires
the parties to establish “joint working arrangements from time to time to administer this
MOU.”60 While the term itself still seems vague, because it does not specify how the
parties will establish arrangements or designate staff, it fits in with the overall character
of this MOU, which is a refining of inter-party communication over an indefinite
period.61
While specificity of language in MOUs seems to help build a cooperative
relationship, MOUs may accomplish this goal without such specificity. This MOU, even
though it lacks timetables and many details, still establishes the main points of
agreement. Both parties recognize overlapping jurisdiction and, despite the 1985 MOU,
communication problems remain.62 The Agreements section lists some of the parties’
grievances over communication.63 The two parties had already been operating under an
MOU for eight years without specificity, and flexibility may have become more
appealing because a level of trust between the two had probably already been established,
thus eliminating a desire for more specific terms.64
Another term to note in the Boilerplate is the Addendum Term--, a term
specifying that this MOU does not supercede the 1985 MOU.65 Instead, this new MOU
seems to be more of a refinement of or addendum to the old MOU, which is still in effect.
58

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
60
Id. at 3.
61
This MOU, like the 2009 MOU between FERC and DOI functions primarily as an official
announcement; in the case of the 2009 MOU it was the announcement of jurisdictional line, in this case it is
a goal announcement that the parties want to communicate better.
62
Id. at 2.
63
Id. at 2-3. The specifics of the terms are not listed here for brevity. To sum up, communication
problems remained and both sides agreed to establish means of notifying the other in some situations, to
promptly notify the other party in other situations, and to refer to the other or review the others
considerations regarding safety conditions.
64
Id. at 3. Note that the MOU got the date of the prior MOU incorrect though they cited to the Federal
Register correctly.
65
Id.
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The purpose of Amendment provisions, typically found in the Termination Clause, is to
eliminate unworkable or poorly conceived terms of agreement over time. It appears that
MOUs between parties may evolve with the parties’ relationship.
C. Interagency Agreement among FERC, U.S. Coast Guard, and Research and
Special Programs Administration
On February 11, 2004, FERC signed an interagency agreement with the USCG
and the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), another department
within the Department of Transportation, regarding safety and security reviews of LNG
facilities.66 This agreement is written with various degrees of strong and broad language
depending on the terms, but where it is broad it is ultimately flexible as well.67 It
provides for on the spot creation of schedules by FERC in conjunction with the other
parties during and LNG application review.68 It also establishes FERC as the lead agency
in the NEPA review and decision, and identifies the USCG and RSPA as cooperating
agencies that will assist with identifying data needs and gathering information.69 It also
includes terms requiring the parties to designate representatives to participate in
inspections and conferences as well as a specification that all communications should be
informal so that they occur as soon as possible.70 The Boilerplate contains the usual
Addendum Clause, Termination Clause, and No Action Term.71 Interestingly though, in
one of the No Action Terms, it says, “This IA is not intended to direct or bind any person
outside the Participating Agencies,” thus insinuating that even though the IA presents no
legal cause of action, it does direct and bind persons within FERC, USCG, and RSPA.72
This document is an example of a second refinement to an already existing MOU.
It shows that the relationship originally established by the 1985 MOU continues to exist
and grow. Not only does it reference the 1985 MOU in its Addendum Clause as the 1993
MOU did, but FERC’s press release refers to the existing relationship by saying, “ [This]
agreement reinforces the agencies' longstanding working relations in coordinating the
seamless review of safety and security issues…”73 This press release seems to evidence a
cooperative relationship between the parties that has been evolving for some time.
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Interagency Agreement Among the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, United States Coast Guard,
and Research and Special Programs Administration For the Safety and Security Review of Waterfront
Import/Export Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities. February 11, 2004. The term Interagency Agreement is
synonymous with an MOU in this context. There may be state or federal agencies that consider an
Interagency Agreement to be a different type of document in there own working environment, but it is
generally, and in FERC’s case, just another wording for Memorandum of Understanding.
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Id. at 3.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 2-3.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 4-5.
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Id. at 4.
73
Id. at 4; “Commission, Coast Guard, DOT Sign Interagency Agreement to Coordinate Review of LNG
Terminal Safety, Security” FERC News Release: February 11, 2004 available at
http://www.ferc.gov/news/news-releases/2004/2004-1/02-11-04-interagency.asp.
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D. Results of the LNG MOUs
In 2005, FERC’s Director of Energy Projects, Mark Robinson, testified as a staff
witness before the United States Senate on the siting and safety status of LNG
terminals.74 The testimony explained that FERC has developed a regulatory process that
involves the coordination of many other interested government agencies as well as the
stakeholders.75 The USCG has primary responsibility for the security of LNG facilities,
but the FERC shares that responsibility.76 According to Director Robinson, FERC’s
practice is to coordinate its regulatory authority with those of other regulating agencies.77
He also notes that preparation of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement is a
cooperative effort between FERC and several other parties, typically including the
USCG, USACE, and USFWS as well as state agencies and other federal agencies.78 The
testimony cites the dual needs of adequate assessment and expedited access as the reason
for cooperation.79 For post-construction inspections, FERC created the LNG Engineering
Branch tasked not only with inspections, but also with coordination with other agencies
such as DOT and USCG.80 To date, this branch is still coordinating inspections, and
while the agencies inspect for different things, they try whenever possible to go to a
particular site at once so as not to overwhelm a facility’s operations.81
Overall, this testimony shows that the original goals of the 1985 and 1993 MOUs
have been met and have become standard operating policy for FERC and DOT. This
level of cooperation is evidenced by the joint security assessments performed by FERC
and USCG, as well as their agreement that future LNG applicants must submit a letter of
intent and commence a security assessment at the when the pre-filing process begins.82 It
also appears that in the twenty years of the operational relationship the inevitable disputes
arising under the MOUs have all been resolved between the affected agency staff
members without rising to higher levels.83 These findings bode well for the ability of an
MOU to build cooperation over time.
VI. The Bureau of Land Management in Oregon
On February 4, 2009 the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council (OEFSC) signed
an MOU with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) regarding the environmental
review and siting of wind energy projects on federal land located in Oregon.84 The
74

Testimony of J. Mark Robinson Director, Office of Energy Projects Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Before the Subcommittee on Energy Of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate. (Feb. 15, 2005).
75
Id. at 3-4.
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Id. at 1.
77
Id. at 9.
78
Id. at 8.
79
Id. at 9.
80
Id. at 13-14.
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Phone Interview with Richard Folley of FERC on 13 August 2009.
82
Testimony of J. Mark Robinson at 18-19.
83
Phone Interview with Richard Folley of FERC on 13 August 2009.
84
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management Oregon State Office, The Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council Concerning Joint

15

impetus of the MOU was the rapidly growing wind industry in Oregon since the turn of
the century. Furthermore, although the BLM manages a great deal of land in Oregon, no
wind farms existed on BLM lands because of the complicated siting process.85 This
agreement is an example of how MOUs can be used to establish a joint application
process.
The Preamble of this MOU states that its purpose is to create a joint
environmental review and to “facilitate a harmonious relationship…in the review of all
[wind power] permit applications.”86 The Background and Acknowledgments show that
for wind power facilities on federal land in Oregon, both the OEFSC and BLM must
undergo separate siting processes.87 The BLM prepares environmental documents
pursuant to NEPA, and the OEFSC prepares an independent assessment “that is
consistent with and does not duplicate Federal Agency review” while considering the
assessments of the Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE), the BLM, and other
interested parties.88 It appears that the OEFSC does what the BLM must do, only through
different statutory authorities and requiring different levels of compliance. The
Acknowledgments include not only the specific statutory authorities of both parties, but
also statements clarifying that the OEFSC, ODOE, and BLM will cooperate in the
preparation of the NEPA documents in a public process, thereby sharing expertise,
eliminating duplicate effort, promoting interagency coordination, providing clarity to the
applicant, and creating a more efficient review process.89 The BLM is the lead agency
for the NEPA compliance, but OEFSC and ODOE will participate through a complete
sharing of information for all the necessary documents thus eliminating duplication of
effort.90
There are three aspects of this MOU that establish the joint application process for
the agencies: first, emphasis on communication, cooperation, and sharing of information
in every aspect of an individual application; second, the flowchart found in the
Attachments section clearly maps out the joint OEFSC/BLM process envisioned by the
parties, coupled with a term allowing for the flowchart to be amended independently of
the MOU;91 finally, and most importantly, the inclusion of terms regarding the necessity
of a separate MOU between the agencies and the applicant.92

Environmental Review for Wind Energy Generation Projects. Feb. 4, 2009. The BLM actually signed the
MOU on January 16th, the OEFSC received it on Jan. 27 and signed it, thus putting it into effect on Feb. 4.
85
In January of 2009, all the wind farms in Oregon existed on private land. The BLM did have
applications pending for rights of way and for the siting of facilities.
86
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management Oregon State Office, The Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council Concerning Joint
Environmenatl Review For Wind Energy Generation Projects at 1 (Feb. 4, 2009).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 2.
89
Id.
90
Id. Other documents required in the process are the Project Plan of Development, Wind Energy PEIS
that BLM has established, BLM Wind Energy National Policy, Field Office Resource Management Plan,
EFSC Notice of Intent, and Application for Site Certification.
91
Id. at 3.
92
Id.
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The Agreements section begins by noting that the parties will “cooperate in their
respective reviews of each project” as well as discussing and sharing information
regularly.93 The parties agree that a primary point of contact will be designated for each
project, and this person will then manage the communications and exchange of
information; the parties also put emphasis on sharing the flowchart with applicants early
in the process.94 Also early in the process, pre-application meetings will be held in which
the BLM will invite all necessary federal agencies, and the ODOE will invite all
necessary state agencies.95 These meetings are held to establish criteria for the necessary
document preparation and to inform the applicant of the parties’ “data and information
needs.”96 Following the pre-application meeting, the parties to this MOU and the
applicant will enter the project specific MOU to ensure a coordinated review process.97
Overall, this seems to be a well-conceived MOU that provides a curious
combination of detail and flexibility. It is detailed the description of the combined
process, but also remains flexible by not defining some terms and allowing parties
freedom of action in many circumstances. As an example of flexibility, there is a clause
allowing the parties to proceed on their own if they cannot agree that the application is
complete.98 The explanation of the joint application process and schedule may be found
in the flowchart attachment, which clearly illustrates the process for the parties and the
applicants.
Unfortunately, success under this MOU is difficult to determine. While the
OEFSC continues to get requests for leases and rights-of-way (ROWs), none involve
federal lands since the MOU went into effect.99 Some of the projects pending at the time
of the MOU signing have moved forward under BLM review, including ROWs for
transmission lines and wind testing facilities.100 However, the MOU did not apply
retroactively, so all of these projects obtained permits through the former process of dual
applications.101 The most likely reason for the lack of applications on federal land
despite the MOU is actually unrelated to the regulatory process and pertains to other
applicant siting considerations, such as ideal wind conditions and proximity to
substations for transmission possibilities.102 Until applicants begin taking advantage of
this new framework the two agencies will be unable to measure success under this MOU.
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Phone interview with Adam Bless of the OEFSC on August 3 2009.
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Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management Oregon State Office, The Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council Concerning Joint
Environmenatl Review For Wind Energy Generation Projects at 1 (Feb. 4, 2009). The very first paragraph
specifies that the MOU applies only to future wind energy projects on federal land in Oregon.
102
Phone interview with Adam Bless of the OEFSC on 3 August 2009 at 1310. Mr. Adam Bless considers
the wind potential to be an applicant’s first concern, the transmission possibilities the second concern, and
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VII. The California Example
Governor Schwarzenneger of California issued Executive Order S-14-2008 (EO)
in November of 2008, declaring an increase in California’s use of renewable energy by
requiring all retail sellers of electricity to obtain at least 33% from renewable sources by
the year 2020 and onward.103 To eliminate some of the resistance towards achievement
of this ambitious undertaking, the executive order also required the Renewable Energy
Transmission Initiative (RETI) to begin identifying zones that could be developed into
renewable energy projects with little or no environmental impact, and it required the
California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Department of Fish and Game
(CDFG) to collaborate in streamlining the review, permitting, and licensing process for
all proposed renewable energy projects in order to cut application times in half within
areas that a Renewable Energy Action Team (comprised of both agencies) identifies as
ideal for renewable energy projects.104 The executive order specifically references two
MOUs signed the same day by the CEC, CDFG, BLM, and the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) in three of its specific orders.105 In doing so, Governor
Schwarzenneger has effectively made compliance with the MOUs’ terms more probable,
because the inference now is that he as Governor of California may enforce them both.106
A. CEC/CDFG MOU
The MOU between the CEC and CDFG on November 17, 2008 formally
establishes the Renewable Energy Action Team (REAT) and defines its purpose as
“[providing] for a streamlined permitting process for renewable energy projects [by
reducing processing time and providing guidance to applicants].”107 It contains a
Preamble that cites the EO in a one-paragraph background followed by a one-paragraph
purpose.108 It then follows with the Agreement section, which sets dates and uses strong,
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Executive Order S-14-08 by the Governor of the State of California. Arnold Schwarzenegger. (Nov. 17,
2008). At 3 of 5.
104
Id. at 3-4 of 5.
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Id. at 3 of 5. Orders 4-6. Order 4 references the CEC/CDFG MOU and begins by saying “Pursuant to
the MOU…” and then goes on to declare specific goals for the Renewable Energy Action Team (REAT),
which that MOU formally creates. These same goals, listed in orders 5-12 of the executive order, are found
in the CEC/CDFG MOU under terms 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. For many of the terms the executive
order mirrors the words of the MOU perfectly, and in the other terms the executive order strays in its words
from those of the MOU only slightly, usually creating slightly more detail. For example, term 10 of the
MOU sets the completion date for the draft DRECP and initiation of the environmental review process as
Dec. 2010, while order 11 of the executive order sets the exact same goal at a completion date of Dec. 31,
2010.
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Email of July 8, 2009 from Ashley Conrad-Saydah to Alastair Deans; “Renewable Energy in California:
Implementing the Governors Renewable Energy Executive Order.” Powerpoint Presentation by Kevin
Hunting of California Biodiveristy Council on March 19, 2009 at EL Centro, CA. Both the email and this
presentation at a stakeholder meeting reference both the MOUs and the Executive Order as directives.
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Department of Fish and Game Regarding the Establishment of the Renewable Energy Action Team. Nov.
17, 2008. at 1.
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specific, almost binding language.109 The Boilerplate consists of only an Amendment
Term.110 Absent is declaration that this MOU does not create a cause of action, a
termination clause, or any other typical terms found in the Boilerplate. This MOU
appears more binding than any other researched thus far. It is possible, albeit unlikely,
that if taken to a court of law it might be interpreted as a contract. Practically speaking,
though, the most likely relief would be specific performance or possibly damages for
delays and both of these could easily be obtained through a formal complaint to the
executive branch, which could order compliance or reallocate funding to compensate one
agency’s reliance faster than any court.
Progress under this MOU is promising. It has the support of the Governor, but it
is also clearly written, and contains deadlines for completion of the terms. It appears that
to date the parties are completing the terms pursuant to the schedule.111
VIII. Conclusion
Memorandums of Understanding appear to be vehicles toward interagency
cooperation, and particularly useful in the areas of overlapping authority for offshore
renewable energy regulation. They function to formalize agreements and understandings
between parties without creating a legal cause of action should one party fail to follow
through with the agreement. Two or more parties sharing a mutual interest typically
enter MOUs voluntarily.112 While the terms are not legally binding, often the members
of the parties who actually carry out the terms of the MOUs view them as directives from
their managers.113 With the authority of an executive order from a higher authority
backing a MOU, the acknowledgments and agreements seem to be viewed as having even
more weight for those parties or people tasked with their fulfillment.114 In either the case
of an MOU voluntarily entered into or one ordered by executive or legislative authority

109

Id. The only term that seems to be unspecific is term 2, saying, “The REAT shall work closely with the
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July 8 2009 Email from Ms. Ashley Conrad-Saydah of the BLM to Mr. Alastair Deans. Though the
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there is a motivation to comply with the terms of agreement, despite the lack legal
binding power.115
Communication, mutual interests, and investments of time and labor in
cooperative efforts serve to bind individuals and groups together.116 This bind can be just
as strong as or stronger than a legal bind, which a party may violate without remorse
absent any other binding so long as the rewards outweigh the legal penalties.117 MOUs
seem to develop cooperation and coordination by recognizing mutual interests, promoting
communication, and establishing clear cooperative actions. These three aspects of an
MOU can lay the foundation for a cooperative relationship among parties. As the parties
successfully and repetitively complete the cooperative acts specified in the MOU, a trust
seems to develop, which further strengthens the relationship, over time turning it into a
key component of the parties’ respective procedures. This is the case with the
FERC/DOT MOUs regarding LNG facilities.
Evidence of MOU success may be difficult to find, especially when the MOU is
new. Outlying factors surrounding the regulatory process cloud any calculation of MOU
streamlining success based on time or cost reduction in applications.118 However,
research indicates that parties to MOUs view the terms of an MOU as controlling, even if
they recognize that they are not legally binding.119 For this reason, MOUs may be more
viable in some situations than contracts. With wording properly tailored to the parties’
needs, an MOU can achieve the desired results. They may be used to establish joint
applications and schedules, as evidenced by the BLM’s MOU with Oregon. Parties
recognize their mutual interests, establish methods for frequent communications, and
provide clear terms so that success is easily observable. Given time and a mutual desire
among governmental agencies to reap the rewards of cooperation and coordination in the
exercise of offshore renewable energy regulatory authority, MOUs have the potential to
establish schedules and joint applications that parties voluntarily comply with absent
legal enforcement; thus, having the potential to build strong cooperative relationships.
115

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 called for FERC to enter a few MOUs, including one with the Secretary
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Taylor, Shelley; Peplau, Letitia; Sears, David. Social Psychology 10th Edition. Prentice Hall. Upper
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Appendix A: Definition of Terms
Acknowledgments: A section of the MOU found in the Preamble, but characteristically a
merger of the Preamble and Agreements. The parties typically cite and recognize one
another’s statutory authority, and typically acknowledge their mutual interests making it a
subtle but powerful opening to any meeting of the minds.
Addendum Term: A boilerplate term specifying that the MOU is in addendum to and
does not terminate or supercede an already existing MOU.
Agreements: The center section and the meat of the MOU, containing the terms to which
the parties specifically agree to abide.
Amendment Term: A boilerplate term allowing amendment of the MOU through some
specified process, but no termination or suspension of the MOU.
Attachments: Any documentation following the signatures necessary to clarify the
understanding. Typical examples are a list of points of contact and a flowchart of
procedures.
Background: Part of the Preamble that describes a situation or existing problem giving
rise to the purpose for this MOU.
BLM: Bureau of Land Management (under the U.S. Department of the Interior)
Boilerplate: The section of a Memorandum of Understanding officially referred to as
General Terms, Miscellaneous Terms, or some variant thereof and containing standard
terms found in most MOU Boilerplates. Examples of these terms include the Fiscal
Term, the Termination Clause, and Limitation of Statute Term.
CEC: California Energy Commission
CZMA: Coastal Zone Management Act
DFG: California Department of Fish and Game
Dispute Resolution Term: Defines the methods for resolving disputes, typically keeping
resolution at the lowest level possible and pushing steadily upward to department heads
when lower echelons fail to resolve a dispute. The research for this paper uncovered no
such term that resorted to arbitration or the court system for dispute resolution.
DOT: Department of Transportation
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement
Effective Upon Term: Defines the date at which the MOU becomes effective, typically
as the date of the last signing.
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FIA Term: Specifies that any exchange of information to certain (typically federal)
parties is subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
Fiscal Term: The fiscal term generally specifies that the MOU is not a funds transfer
document nor does it provide the authority for such a transfer, and that any attempt to
transfer funds of any kind ancillary to the MOU’s terms must be accompanied by a
separate written agreement and must also comply with all applicable laws.
FPA: Federal Power Act
Limitation of Statute Term: This term reflects one of the primary concerns government
agencies will have in entering agreements, they are unable to supercede their statutory
authority. This term states that compliance with all other terms of the MOU is only
required to the extent an agency is authorized to act by law.
LNG: Liquid Natural Gas
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
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MMS: Minerals Management Service
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act
No Action Term: This term is one of the identifying terms in an MOU as opposed to a
contract. It specifies that the MOU does not create any possible action at law, via any
enforceable rights, benefits, trusts, etc. either substantive or procedural at law or equity.
OCS: Outer Continental Shelf
OEFSC: Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council
Preamble: The first of three main sections of the MOU, containing Background or
Introduction, Acknowledgments, and Purpose. It is the lead in to the Agreements.
Purpose: A Preamble section in which the parties declare their mutual interest to be
satisfied by the terms of the MOU
REAT: Renewable Energy Action Team
REPT: Renewable Energy Permit Team
RETI: Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative
RSPA: Research and Special Programs Administration
Termination Clause: Defines a date, method, or other condition for termination of the
agreement. Typical clauses state that the agreement is terminated after completion of all
terms to the satisfaction of all parties, or that it may be terminated by the mutual written
agreement of all parties, or even that one party may opt out of the MOU by a written
thirty days notice to all other parties (occasionally requiring consent of the other parties).
USACE: United States Army Corps of Engineers
USCG: United States Coast Guard
USFWS: United States Fish and Wildlife Service
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Appendix B:Sample/Hypothetical MOU
(This is not an existing MOU, and uses the agencies as an example only)
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND
THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Background
President ____________ issued Executive Order _______ on __________,
calling for more coordination between agencies involved in the siting and regulation of
Offshore Renewable Energy Facilities in an effort to streamline the process and thus
encourage investor confidence.
Acknowledgments
The Department of the Interior (DOI) by and through its Minerals Management
Service (MMS) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)(jointly as the
Parties), as parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), hereby acknowledge
and declare the following:
A. MMS has exclusive jurisdiction to issue leases, easements, and rights-of-way
regarding Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lands for hydrokinetic projects pursuant
to Section 8(p) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §
1337(p) (2006).
B. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses and exemptions for hydrokinetic
projects located on the OCS pursuant to Part I of the Federal Power Act (FPA) 16
U.S.C. §§792-823a (2006) and Sections 405 and 408 of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§2705, 2708 (2006).
C. FERC will not issue preliminary permits on the OCS.
D. FERC will not issue a license or exemption to an applicant for an OCS nonfederal hydrokinetic project until the applicant has first obtained a lease,
easement, or right of way from MMS for the site thereof.
E. The Parties are required by law to conduct necessary analyses and prepare
necessary environmental documents under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions.
F. The Parties may both attach terms and conditions to their leases, easements, rights
of way, licenses, or exemptions. The Parties may inspect authorized projects to
ensure compliance with the attached terms and conditions.
G. It is in the interest of both Parties to prepare joint environmental documents for
the purposes of their NEPA analysis for individual non-federal hydrokinetic
applicants. It is also in the interest of both parties to coordinate terms and
conditions and subsequent inspections.
H. The parties recognize and agree that _____ shall be the lead agency in preparation
of joint environmental documents, but that this does not diminish ______’s
statutory authority to regulate non-federal OCS hydrokinetic projects.
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Purpose
The Purpose of this MOU is to create a means by which the Parties shall establish
a joint environmental review whereby jointly prepared NEPA documents will satisfy
their individual informational requirements. Ideally, a one-stop application process shall
result. This shall eliminate duplication of effort thus saving time and energy to both
Parties. It will also facilitate a sharing of information and staff expertise thus providing
better and speedier analysis, which is in the interest of the Parties, all other federal, state,
and non-governmental agencies, and all stakeholders including the applicant.
The Purpose of this MOU is also to establish cooperation and support in the
attachment of terms and conditions to authorized projects as well as any subsequent
inspections to ensure compliance. Cooperation will eliminate time and energy spent on
duplicative efforts as well as contradictory terms and conditions.
Agreements
The Parties hereby agree to the following terms:
1. Each party shall designate a member of their staffs as a point of contact prior to
the signing of this MOU. An attachment to this MOU shall list each point of
contact’s name, business mailing address, business phone number, and email
address. The points of contact shall communicate when necessary to ensure their
parties’ compliance with the terms of this MOU. Points of Contact may be
subsequently changed by two weeks written notice to the other party.
2. All communication between points of contact shall be electronically unless paper
documentation is requested.
3. The points of contact shall compile bi-annual memorandum reports, to be filed
with the head of their agency on or within five days prior to the 15th of January,
and on or within five days prior to the 15th of July. These reports shall outline the
level of compliance with and coordination achieved between the parties. The
head of each agency shall keep these reports on file for no less than three years of
the date of filing, and shall provide copies to the head of the other agency or to the
Cabinet at their request.
4. The Parties hereby create a Hydrokinetic Application Team (HAT) to consist of
three staff representatives from each party. These staff members must be
acquainted with their parties’ regulatory procedures and schedules. These staff
members are to be announced by emails exchanged between points of contact
within five business days of the signing of this MOU. The emails shall include
staff members’ names, business addresses, business phone numbers, and email
addresses.
5. HAT shall meet for at least eight hours per week, beginning within thirty days of
the signing of this MOU. Staff members may be excused from meetings by their
agency’s point of contact when necessary, but an alternate staff member must
attend meetings in an absentee’s place.
6. HAT shall compile a Joint Hydrokinetic Application Plan (JHAP) to thoroughly
integrate the Parties’ schedules and procedures for the creation of, notice of, and
review of environmental documents required by NEPA. JHAP shall create an
environmental review process for non-federal hydrokinetic projects on the OCS
that utilizes the same documents for both FERC’s and MMS’s needs.
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7. JHAP is to be filed with the Points of Contact, Department Heads, and with the
Cabinet within seven months of the signing of this MOU. Within five business
days of JHAP filing, the Points of Contact will schedule a meeting for the
department heads within thirty days of the date of JHAP filing; the purpose of this
meeting will be to discuss the plan, and either sign an MOU implementing it or
return it to HAT for amendment with a schedule for amendment not to exceed
sixty days. When HAT has completed the requested amendments to JHAP, the
amended JHAP shall be filed, within five business days the Points of Contact
shall set a meeting to occur within thirty days of the amended filing, and at that
meeting the Department Heads shall either sign an MOU implementing the
amended JHAP or request further amendments or terminate this MOU.
8. HAT’s first meeting shall establish a schedule necessary to complete and file the
JHAP within seven months. Upon filing of the JHAP, HAT is no longer required
to meet, unless called on to amend the JHAP, as specified in Term 7, at which
time HAT will again be required to meet for a minimum of eight hours per week
until the amended JHAP is filed.
9. The Point of Contact for MMS shall provide FERC’s Point of Contact with a list
of its proposed terms and conditions, if any, ten days prior to issuing a lease,
easement, or right of way for a non-federal OCS hydrokinetic project. FERC’s
Point of Contact will assign a staff member involved with the relevant project to
review MMS’s terms and conditions to assure that none are or may be in conflict
with FERC’s own proposed terms and conditions to be attached to the FERC
license or exemption for the relevant project. This review is to be complete
within five days of receipt of MMS’s terms and conditions.
10. If any of the parties proposed terms and conditions conflict or potentially may
conflict, the Points of Contact shall communicate to establish a meeting between
the parties’ respective staff members for the project. The meeting shall occur no
more than fifteen days after MMS provided FERC with its proposed Terms and
Conditions. The respective staffs shall confer at this meeting to amend their
respective terms and conditions so as to eliminate all existing or potential
conflicts, or in the even that a potential conflict cannot be eliminated, to create a
method of mitigation in the event that the potential conflict materializes. These
amendments are to be complete by the end of the meeting. If the meeting fails to
completely address the conflict, the conflict shall be resolved as specified in the
this MOU’s Miscellaneous Term 8.
11. The parties agree to notify each other by way of their Points of Contact within
three days following the scheduling of a non-federal OCS Hyrdrokinetic project
inspection, or two days prior to any non-scheduled inspection. Once a party
notifies the other of an inspection, the other has the option of joining the
inspection or waiving the right to join the inspection. This term will be
considered complete, void, and superceded by Term 13 three months after the
signing of this MOU.
12. The parties agree to notify the other as soon as possible in the event of an
emergency inspection. In the case of an emergency inspection the other party
must waive the right to join the inspection and the inspecting party must provide
the other party a copy of the inspection report within a day of its filing,
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accompanied with a memorandum explaining the need for the emergency
inspection.
13. The Points of Contact and department heads shall hold all inspection scheduling
meetings for non-federal OCS Hydrokinetic projects jointly at a time and place of
the parties’ mutual convenience three months after the signing of this MOU and
thereafter. These scheduling meetings coordinate to the greatest extent allowed
by law all inspections by FERC and MMS. In the event of an inspection
involving only one party, the reason for the solo inspection shall be provided to
the Points of Contact for both parties within a day of the inspection report filing.
The Points of Contact will explain the solo inspection in their bi-annual report.
Miscellaneous Terms
1. Each of the Parties shall use its own appropriation to carry out its responsibilities
under this MOU.
2. This MOU is not a fiscal or funds obligation instrument. Nothing in this MOU
requires the Parties to obligate or expend funds in excess of available
appropriations. Any transfer of funds related to the terms of this MOU must be
accompanied by an appropriate funds transfer document as required by applicable
law.
3. This MOU is strictly for internal management purposes. It does not confer any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, by any
party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.
4. Nothing in this MOU will be construed to affect the responsibilities of the Parties
beyond their respective statutory authorities.
5. This MOU supplements but does not amend, modify, or terminate the April 2009
MOU between the Parties. This MOU is intended to increase the level of
cooperation between the parties by expanding some of the responsibilities
established in the April 2009 MOU.
6. For clarity, the schedule for completion of this MOU’s terms is attached.
7. Upon the signing of a second MOU implementing the JHAP, HAT shall be
dissolved and Agreement Terms 4-8 of this MOU shall be considered complete
and therefore no longer a part of this MOU.
8. Disputes shall be resolved by the lowest level possible. A dispute should first be
resolved by the parties’ respective staff members in dispute. If this proves
impossible, the dispute should be resolved by the Points of Contact. If this proves
impossible the dispute should be resolved by the Department Heads. If this
proves impossible the MOU shall be amended. If this does not resolve the dispute
the MOU shall be terminated.
9. In the event that a party lacks sufficient funding to comply with the terms of this
MOU, this MOU may be suspended, amended, or terminated with thirty days
written notice to the other party. In the event that an Amended JHAP is not
signed by the Department Heads, the Department Heads may mutually strike
Agreement Terms 4-8 from this MOU or individually strike Agreement Terms 48 with thirty days written notice to the other party. During the Thirty days notice
the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve the problem, including asking
members of the Cabinet to act as mediators, and if successful the notice to strike
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shall be canceled. In the Event that a dispute rises to the level of the Department
Heads and cannot be resolved, the Department Heads may mutually agree to
strike, amend, or modify the terms of the MOU causing the dispute or agree to
mutually terminate the MOU; an individual party may strike, amend, or modify
the terms of the MOU causing the dispute or terminate the MOU upon thirty days
written notice to the other party. During the thirty days the parties shall make a
good faith effort to resolve the dispute, including asking members of the Cabinet
to act as mediators, and if successful the notice to shall be canceled.
10. This MOU becomes affective upon the last signatory date.

______________________________________________
Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

__________________
Date

______________________________________________
Secretary of the Interior

__________________
Date
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Attachment A: Points of Contact
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:

_______________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________

Minerals Management Service:

_______________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________
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Attachment B: Schedule
Prior to Signing: Points of Contact are designated and listed on MOU
Five Days after Signing: Points of Contact have announced three staff members apiece
for HAT
Thirty Days after Signing: HAT has begun meeting at least eight hours per week
Three Months After Signing: All FERC and MMS inspection scheduling meetings to
ensure compliance with terms and conditions are now held jointly, and every
attempt shall be made to conduct only joint inspections
Seven Months After Signing: JHAP has been filed with the Points of Contact,
Department Heads, and the Cabinet
Seven Months and Five Business Days after Signing: Points of Contact have scheduled
meeting for Department Heads
Seven Months and Thirty Days after Signing: Department Heads have met and either
signed an MOU implementing JHAP or requested amendment
Seven Months and Ninety Days after Signing: Any Requested Amendments are
complete
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